Discussing Macro Economic Events
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What is Missing from the Bank Bailout

After the stimulus bill passes, President Obama and Tim Geithner will propose the next bank bailout. The concept of the bailout is the “bad bank”: Toxic assets are lifted from the bank balance sheets so lending can resume.

The key to stimulating lending is to resume interbank lending. Interbank lending can not fully resume until banks are comfortable their bank counterparts do not have any toxic assets, which under-performance could trigger a default. A default would make it difficult for the lending bank to receive its cash.

Look at the LIBOR yield curves on

feb-9th-2007-interbank-lending

feb-6-2009-interbank-lending

The steepness of today’s yield curve shows how skittish banks are in lending money for long durations, including one year.

Many worry the “bad bank” will cost the taxpayers money. Banks will not sell toxic assets for their true worth. Yet if banks agree to sell, many fear the taxpayer will pay too much. These “toxic assets” are packaged “subprime” mortgages. As job losses continue, home prices continue to decline and defaults continue to increase. Volatility makes valuing these assets almost impossible. Worse, this volatility is starting to damage mortgages further up the food chain.

Restarting the ability to make these mortgages worth anything are the following two statistics.

1) Real Median Household Income has not increased since 2000 - incomeinamerica1

2) Since 2000, The US Current Account Deficit has increased as a percentage of World GDP

Since consumers are (were) 70% of the US Economy, any increase in home values in the bast eight years has been on the backs of household borrowing. Until US Families can annually earn more, home values and mortgage portfolios will not follow suit. Homeowners need to pay back existing loans and earn more for future consumption at the same time.

The economy that increases real median household income is the next question. The recent share, both overall size and contributions to growth of the Finance Sector, contributed to our current state.  This is not assigning blame. We need capital to back people, ideas, bringing improvements to today and tomorrow’s economy. But we need to make more than financial products if we are going to lead the world, resume growth, and further pay for social security and medicare/medicaid.

Which brings us to the bailout. Must we do something? Yes. But lending can not resume to its 2006/2007 state unless we have an economy with a stronger manufacturing base to support it. Leverage on leverage only brings defaults and further trouble.

That is the challenge of this administration and the the private sector -aka - everyone. If we can create an economy that creates wealth for everyone, our future will be far brighter.

February 8, 2009   No Comments

Why TARP Funding is Flawed

As Congress released the second round of TARP funding this past week, anxiety grew that its original purpose is failing: banks are not lending.

To discern why, we must think about the relationship between the TARP funding requirements and Federal Reserve Monetary Policy.

With banks taking write downs during the fall of 2008, its plausible to assume TARP funding was the only new source of capital - all remaining bank liabilities and assets were matched after write downs, tied to existing economic activity. The only source of capital for new economic activity was TARP funding, now $700 billion. To give comfort to this assumption, add up the market capitalization of the largest US banks - far smaller than TARP.

By law,  TARP funding is preferred equity on a bank balance sheet, with a 5% annual dividend. Add on administrative costs, and a loan just to break even needs approximately 6%, just to service the taxpayer requirements of TARP. Yet through Open Market Operations, the US Ten Year Treasury currently yields 2.34%, according to the Financial Times and the effective Fed Funds rate is 0.18%. TARP funding requirements place this large source of new capital no where near this historically low yield curve, completely at odds with Open Market Operations.

Two years ago, overnight treasuries traded at 5%. When the economy grows at 3% per year, an inflation at 2%, a business owner merely switches on the lights to pay back a 5% interest bearing loan. Yet in today’s environment, 5% is expensive. In today’s environment -a ZIRP interest rate environment - a recessionary environment - a deflationary environment,  those willing to accept north of 5% (6%) is a classic adverse selection problem: The smart businesses horde cash as new cash is too expensive. The businesses accepting such a loan may not be able to pay it back.

Faced with the prospect of new bad loans, it is no surprise banks are not lending. They would rather preserve capital to plug foreseen bad loans in the coming year. Further, to achieve 5%, M&A is a preferred method, scooping up the right loan packages at the right price.

A Solution:

This page has long argued TARP dividends should be a rolling average of the yield on treasury bills/notes - the opportunity cost of taxpayers funding the banks. If yields are low, economic activity is weak, keeping dividend payments manageable. If yields are higher, (assuming no runaway inflation) economic activity has increased as treasuries were sold for corporates, again making dividend payments manageable. We hope the new administration makes this change.

January 18, 2009   1 Comment

What is a Publicly Subsidized Credit Default Swap

This blog has focused on the FDIC insurance program guaranteeing newly issued bank debt.

Here is why:

Reviewing the facets of the right hand of the balance sheet, the taxpayer and printing press are very active.

  • Short Term Liabilities, Commercial Paper - Guarantor - The Fed
  • Short Term, Long Term Debt - Guarantor - The FDIC
  • Preferred Equity - The Treasury

This blog believes the FDIC program is the most powerful government program helping banks currently expand credit.

A lot has been written on Credit Default Swaps. These unregulated instruments were instrumental in causing a crisis of credit, in turn causing a crisis of economic performance.

Let’s examine where these two issues meet: The Fee the FDIC charges banks to guarantee their new debt. This fee is the Credit Default Swap the FDIC (aka, the US Taxpayer) sells to guarantee new bank debt (from Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley to John Deere Capital).

What should the price of the swap be? Evidence from one source this month says as high as 7% or 700 bp annually of principal. The FDIC begs to differ. For any debt issued and set to expire more than a year from now, the FDIC is selling a CDS for 100bp, or an annual 1% of principal. While the CDS market is not transparent enough to determine the true price, it is fair to say 1% is cheap, or subsidized.

Is this enough? Is it even necessary to charge a fee or subsidize the entire swap?

  • Right now, the FDIC has ~$33.4 billion in the bank, to guarantee this program as well as all accounts now $250,000 or less.
  • Let’s assume most outstanding bonds covenants are written to ensure seniority is universally established in the event of a default.
  • For the big banks, would the taxpayer just guarantee the debt sold with the FDIC swap? Comparing Lehman to Citi, the answer is probably not.
  • Finally, given the lack of public savings, the taxpayer will have to return to the debt market should any bailout be necessary.

Is the FDIC program helping to fuel cheap credit? Yes. But given the US Fiscal Condition and its new precident of response to a crisis, the taxpayer should realize it is selling underfunded Credit Default Swaps just like the banks it now stands behind.

December 25, 2008   No Comments

Deleveraging in Practice

Preparing for 2009, this week marked a terrific example of de-leveraging in practice.

  • As of Friday, December 19th, according to the Financial Times One year US Libor was 2.09%
  • As of Friday, December 19th, according to the Wall Street Journal, no Treasury expiring prior to 2015 yielded more than 2%.
  • And, as of Friday, December 19th, according to the Financial Times, the Fed Funds effective rate was 0.11%

So, there has never been a cheaper time to borrow, right? Only if you have an FDIC (taxpayer) stamp next to your offering. Take a look who issued debt this past week, courtesy of the Financial Times.

Financial Times: Week ofDec-19th-bond-issues-us

One side note: Even John Deere Capital got into the FDIC mix! So don’t tell GM and Chrysler they can’t have taxpayer loans.

According to the WSJ, this week was the final week in 2008 for private bond offerings. The lack of Corporate Debt issued should provide guidance that the US Economy (by force or by choice) is continuing its de-leveraging.

Final side note: According to the Wall Street Journal, The Illinois Finance Authority is set to offer $500 million in bonds on December 26th. Though it is independent of the State, this should be an interesting post-Christmas verdict on Governor Blagojevich.

December 21, 2008   1 Comment

Reviewing the FOMC Statement

As predicted, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) dropped its core interest rate by 75bp. A surprise to many, not to this blog. Enough bragging, these are scary times:

  • The first reason is the FOMC statement: “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent”

A target range? This is the first time in recent memory the FOMC has stated it would establish a range and not a specific rate for its open market operations.  The minutes of this meeting will be very interesting:

  • This blog will predict that the FOMC will admit it has lost control of the Fed Funds rate.

And that is very scary. Even though the Fed now pays interest on reserves, instead of only buying short term treasuries -, the actions to control the Fed Funds rate are not working: There is no demand to use capital in this economy: From the Financial Times:

  • The Fed Fund rate sits at 0.12%, remaining unchanged from before the rate cut.
  • Overnight LIBOR is 0.0115% (because the Fed pays interest on reserves)
  • Overnight 3m Treasuries are 0.01%

Deflation:

Reserves sitting at the Fed have ballooned to almost $700 billion, comparable to envisioned TARP program.  Yet that money is parked there most likely because the Fed has been gobbling up Treasuries, driving the yields to zero. It is not going outward into the economy.

If you believe in Milton Friedman, then you believe the following:  Without lending activity and expansion of the monetary base - demonstrated by these spreads - then at best, the money supply is not keeping pace with the economy. Therefore, deflation.

It might be worse. If the expansion only sits in existing treasuries, and those treasuries are not new issues for new government programs - aka - the stimulus, then all we’ve done is increased the demand for treasuries and done nothing to expand the economy. Further, remember the taxpayer has only saved money from the latest treasury issuance. Other issues had more expensive yields. In a deflationary environment, this problem is only compounded. 

Until the stimulus is enacted, we must expect a deflationary environment for at least the short term. And that will cause the FOMC to continue its inabilty to control the Fed Funds rate.

December 19, 2008   No Comments

More FDIC Bonds - How much more?

As a follow up to Note 15, this week banks in the US issued $23.8 Billion more in FDIC (taxpayer backed) debt. This is on top of the roughly $17 billion issued last week. The total amounts exceed the reserves the FDIC has in the bank. Looking at where other debt is trading for major banks, the FDIC (the taxpayer) is subsidizing each bank (B of A, GS, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, etc.) by approximately 300 basis points.

December 6, 2008   No Comments

Putting the Proposed Auto Bailout in Perspective

First off, Happy Thanksgiving to you and yours!

Last week Goldman Sachs became the first “bank” to float a bond issue guaranteed by the FDIC.   A look at the weekly debt issues from the Financial Times shows US banks springing back into action, all issuing FDIC guaranteed debt. As I can tell, these are the first bond issues of any major financial institution in Dollars since Lehman’s declaration of bankruptcy.

(For the purposes of this post, all noted bonds sold close enough to par that coupon yields as first order approximations for true yields will suffice. Sorry Professor Jenter!)

  • Goldman Sachs issued $5 billion due in June 2012 yielding 3.25%
  • Morgan Stanley issued $2.25 billion due in Dec 2010 yielding 2.90% and $2.5 billion expiring in December 2011 3.25% and $1 billion due in June 2011, half of which has a known floating rate of   1 month LIBOR plus 74 bp.
  • JP Morgan issued $5 billion due in December 2011 yielding 3.125% and $1billion due in December 2010 with floating rate interest of 3 month LIBOR plus 50bp .

Thanks to the FDIC guarantee, the yields on these bonds are very low, making them very favorable for the issuing banks. Yet the FDIC has only $34.6 billion in funds for this purpose or general insurance on accounts up to $250,000.

I would argue the FDIC’s funds are too small to take on insuring now larger accounts as well as guaranteeing bank bonds. So, the taxpayer is on the hook for  $16.75 billion of new bank debt.

Let’s put that amount in perspective.

  • GM, Ford, and Chrysler are asking for $25 billion
  • The net CDS exposure on GM and Ford amounts to $9.6 billion
  • As I wrote in Note Four A, as part of the TARP program, the tax payer is due to receive roughly $18 billion in dividends from the first $250 billion the Treasury is injecting as preferred equity capital into these same banks.
  • John McCain railed against earmarks all campaign long. President Elect Barack Obama said earmarks amount to $18 billion a year.

Further, it is important to compare the incredibly low yields on these bonds:

  • In the week of November 7, 2008 Ireland, a sovereign euro denominated nation that stated it would guarantee all deposits from six of its largest financial institutions, sold 4 billion of euro debt, due in November 2011, yielding 4.0%

And during the Year of Cheap Credit, Fall of 2006-Spring of 2007 (without any FDIC backing)

  • In September of 2006, Goldman Sachs issued 750 million euros due in October, 2021 yielding 4.75%
  • In September of 2006, Citi issued 1.25 billion euros due in October, 2013 yielding 3.95%
  • In February of 2007, three banks no longer in existence in the same form issued long duration debt:
  1. Wachovia issued 1 billion euros due in February 2014 yielding 3 month Euro LIBOR plus 15 bp.
  2. Lehman Brothers issued 1 billion euros due in March, 2019 yielding 4.625%
  3. Merrill Lynch issued 1 billion euros due in February , 2012 yielding 3 month Euro LIBOR plus 18 bp.

Side Note: it is amazing reviewing that year of cheap credit how few bonds were issued in dollars relative to Euros and Sterling. It made me believe Mayor Mike Bloomberg was right to worry New York was losing out as the capital of global finance.

IN SUM: This is new uncharted waters for the US Taxpayer. What if one of the banks uses the funding to underwrite new acquisitions that create “synergies” resulting in laid off workers? What if the funds are used  to lever up a commodities bet? I do not believe banks raised enough capital to make single bets of that systemic threatening magnitude, but the overall point is this:

  • In large part, banks and autos are short term inelastic industries. Without a bank, its hard to save currency and its hard to do commerce. Without a car in the USA, its hard to travel from point A to B.
  • There are plenty of foreign banks and plenty of foreign car companies.
  • I reckon between the FDIC, Treasury and Fed plans, we are spending close or guaranteeing close to $2 trillion, ~15% of GDP, for our private sector banking industry. While congress has made “noises” on insufficient bank lending, there is no plan attached to this funding. Yet produce autos and ask for $25 billion, you’d better have a plan.
  • Bottom line for CEOs learning how to manage through a future crises: It sure pays to be the industry first in line for help.

December 1, 2008   2 Comments

Is the Liquidity Crunch Over?

Is the liquidity crunch over?

Here is my thinking:

Let’s review treasury rates (aka, the “riskless” rates) for the US and UK over the next six months. According to the Financial Times data on November 14th, 2008:

  • US treasuries set to expire in six months yield 87 basis points (Deflation).
  • UK treasuries set to expire in six months yield 199 basis points (who knows)
  • One British Pound today is worth 1.4827 US Dollars
  • One British Pound’s worth in six months as of today’s spot forward is 1.4807 US Dollars

The rates for sovereign taxpayer debt and the interlinking value in currency should display the differences in risk of each country.

  • $100 invested in US treasuries vs. $100 invested in UK treasuries and converted at the corresponding spot and forward rates should yield the same rate of return.
  • Converting $100 to pound equivalents, investing in UK treasuries, and returning those pounds to US Dollars six months from now returns a dollar more (.98 US cents) in value.

In normal times, no way. Someone in any trading house would be looking for the “blips” to quote Michael Lewis from Liar’s Poker. Here are a two observations why this opportunity exists today:

  • As discussed in previous posts, we’ve witnessed massive flight to quality recently, as capital has left emerging markets and safe harbored itself in US Treasuries
  • The REPO market continues to be stressful. Again, as discussed in previous posts, the lack of shorting treasury opportunities has caused massive spreads differences in otherwise equally risky cash flows.

What is interesting though is that the link between currency and risk still exists for the most part. For the UK though, that means its current treasury yields are tied far more to the US and the Dollar than they are to their own interest rate policy (currently at 3.00%). While the Bank of England has been aggressive in rate reductions, its own government bonds in no way reflect this.

November 17, 2008   No Comments

Emerging Market Debt Spreads - How things have changed

Remember the good old days of 2006-07?

On a random January 17th, 2007 3-Month LIBOR was 5.36%. Yet two treasuries were bidding 4.91%. The Fed Funds target rate was 5.25%. In short, spreads were short.

More amazing were Emerging Market Bonds and the market’s confidence in sovereign performance.

  • On that same January 17th, 2007, the Ukraine’s debt expiring in June, 2013 was priced only 1.35% higher than US government bonds of the same duration.
  • South Africa was only 0.97 basis points more and
  • Russia, the country that would 18 months later invade Georgia, had debt set to expire in March, 2030 only 100 basis points more than the US treasuries.

(sigh)

The picture is significantly different today.

  • At market close on November 12th, Ukraine’s debt noted above is now 18.13% more than US treasuries.
  • South Africa’s is 6.61% greater .
  • And Russia’s debt is 5.45% higher.

Why?

Current Account Deficits are the place to look.

  • Ukraine: At the end of 2006, 3.71% of GDP. Today,  the IMF estimates it is 7.2% of GDP
  • South Africa: At the end of 2006, 7.26% of GDP. Today,  the IMF estimates it is 8.0% of GDP
  • Russia: At the end of 2006, it had a surplus of 9.50% of GDP. Today,  the IMF estimates it had dropped to 6.4% of GDP.

In general, owing more to debtors outside your own walls creates one of two possibilities:

  1. Default (as in the case of Argentina)
  2. Currency devaluation, which when importing basic staples or other durables, causes inflation, making the bond payments less valuable

But further, this massive spread increase could also be caused by a flight to “quality” of US Treasuries. Capital is simply skittish of anything but the US Taxpayer. Which, at this point, should give us all pause.

Regardless, the bailout the G1, G3, G7 are trying is crimping the ability for emerging markets to raise capital, increasing strain on IMF funding and solvency.  Crowding out 101 is in effect.

November 13, 2008   No Comments

Evaluating the Return for Taxpayers

For Taxpayers, the returns depend on your view.

  • The terms of the treasury (on behalf of the tax-payer) investment are a dividend of 5% of invested capital.
  • The preferred share investment is callable anytime after three years.
  • Should the banks issue new equity prior to three years, they can buy out the tax-payer at par with that funding. In essence, any current equity owner is diluted regardless.

The taxpayer does not have any savings (found in lack in government surplus), so it must raise debt to fund the bank bailout.

Examining two and five year treasury yields, they are priced at 1.555% and 2.609%. respectively.  Assuming the Treasury Department does the right thing (See Note Four A), it will sell five year debt to finance the bailout.

Doing the math, paying 2.609% to receive 5% seems like a good deal. It does make a lot of arguments against it seem not as compelling.

Here’s another way to look at the deal though.

Assume the treasury invests up to $250 Billion, the returns over three years are $6 Billion a year. Enough to pay for approximately one year of pork projects John McCain rails against continuously.

Is this then a good investment? You decide.

October 26, 2008   1 Comment