Martin Feldstein’s column, (June 29, 2009) on inflation opines that while federal stimulus is still necessary, a combination of looming deficits, federal reserve bond purchases, and skittishness of foreign investors are pushing yields on the 10 Year Treasury up to alarming levels.

Feldstein’s major premise is detailed in the second paragraph of his column: Higher Yields have led to higher mortgage rates, reducing home buying, depressing net worth tremendously in the last six months. Further, lower home prices have caused more defaults and “weakened bank balance sheets”.

Lets correct some facts: Between 2006 and Six Months ago (December 2008), house prices dropped 27 percent. From December 2008 to March 2009 - the latest month of data,  housing prices fell comparatively 7%. Further, August 2009 Futures for Case-Shiller Composite index is currently trading at 152.0 slightly above where the index level stood in December of 2008, bookmarking the recent rise in treasury yields.

Feldstein, in his column, notes that the current spread between 10-year TIPS and 10 year Treasuries shows an inflation expectation of 2% annually. That inflation predictions have “jumped” to slightly over 2% per year is hardly alarming. 2% is often seen as an inflation target. That the jump in rates is perpetrated by fears foreign investors may no longer continue to buy US debt is simply not true.

China, most notably, while making loud noises is in a “dollar trap”, argued most notably by Paul Krugman. Fail to purchase US Treasuries, and decline the dollar’s value, making our goods cheaper and China’s goods more expensive, ending China’s competitive advantage in manufacturing.

At a high-level, if manufacturing in China continues to keep durable good costs down, and the Federal Stimulus package will improve roads and cargo lines, reducing transportation costs, price increases outside of energy spikes are hard to imagine for durable goods measured in CPI.

Perhaps Feldstein’s view of investor skittishness and his call for the Fed to assure the markets it will curb future “inflationary lending” are really directed at asset inflation: Perhaps investors believe that while policy makers are acting vigorously, nothing structurally has or is going to change to prevent another asset bubble similar to house price inflation witnessed over this past decade.

Asset inflation, be it houses or equities, is much harder to prevent than inflation in durable goods. Let us hope our fiscal stimulus and monetary policy are giving the economy surer footing to produce more, sharing those productivity gains across a wider spectrum, ensuring a diverse economy in the odds of preventing future asset bubbles.

The Fed mulls an inflation target, to stabilize the economy. Robert Shiller and George Akerlof, in their new book Animal Spirits, argue for a “credit target”, a level of lending to keep the economy near full employment. In the middle is an old question - Should Central Banks consider Asset Bubbles a form of inflation?

Look at the 2008 Commodities Bubble:

• January 2nd, 2008 - According to the Financial Times, One month Oil Futures on the NYMEX were $99.62
• July 2nd, One month Oil Futures were $144.26
• December 30, One month Oil Futures were $39.03

That the Fed insists on Core Inflation, excluding energy, made it miss how energy moves all consumers prices. Consumers pulled back on gasoline purchases in the short term and in the long term, terminated SUV purchases, crippling GM and Chrysler.

Yet during oil’s rise, the Fed had to reduce the Fed Funds rate as the effects of Bear Stearns was first on its mind. It’s not clear the Fed could have raised rates to prevent oil’s rise, without crippling the economy.

Preventing the Housing Bubble though could have eliminated what we currently witness: Global de-leveraging and massive reassessment of household wealth. The sheer amount of leverage also helped fuel stock market booms (of which some was real) giving consumer confidence in 401k statements. Add to this the house market boom, household behavior such as reverse mortgages, credit card spending, an overall negative savings rates would probably not have occurred.

Yet the Fed’s role in determining over-investment is tricky, politically controversial. Without world-wide coordination for world wide bubbles, false arbitrage opportunities such as the Carry Trade can wreak havoc on international trade/commerce.

What Shiller, Akerlof, and all concerned about asset bubbles really want is an economy where the Financial Sector does not a) contribute the most to GDP growth and b) rise too disproportionately in terms of total GDP. This was our economy prior to this crisis. The economy must have real growth, not growth due to paper assets. Once perception is pricked on over priced assets, no one knows an assets true worth, causing trust and lending stop.

If Central Banks can not politically prevent asset bubbles, then our government must improve its risk management program. Two logical improvements are as follows:

1. Regulation and oversight must increase. Madoff’s false profits now cause hospital wings  to go without funding. Mortgage Originators are forcing real family pain on false interest rate promises.  And we all witness a loss in market confidence.
2. Running government surpluses in healthy economic times. 90 years ago, John Maynard Keynes worried about this very issue we now face. Certainly, government surpluses up until now would reduce our worry over how much debt we must now raise.

Only a start, but planning for the future must occur to prevent a future colapse of this proportion.

It is time to take stock of where the market sees the economy moving in 2009. Let’s examine

• Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Futures - tracking the effective Federal Funds rate
• Three-Month Eurodollar Futures - tracking three month LIBOR - the base private lending rate
• Oil Futures - tracking energy
• Dow Futures tracking industrial performance

2009-economic-indicators1

Let’s start with the base of the economy, the effective Fed Funds rate. By reviewing OIS Futures, the Market believes by the fall of 2009, the Fed will have increased the target funds rate to 0.5%. Further, economic activity will be strong enough that the effective rate will mirror the target rate by both the midyear and by the end of the year. Treasuries expiring in December 2009 yield 0.41%, according to the Wall St. Journal, close to the effective funds rate Dec-09 futures.

Three Month Eurodollar futures, a mirroring instrument to 3 month LIBOR trading on the CME state marginal increases in lending cost.  Considering treasuries expiring in March 2010 yield 0.4% (compared to treasuries expiring in December 2009), there is still a very high TED Spread - the private capital trust spread -by the end of 2009.

Oil futures-according to the Wall St. Journal-  show robust increases in energy cost. Further, according to the WSJ, there is no change in Dollar futures against a world currency basket through 2009. This shows a pickup in world oil demand, potentially a pickup in global economic growth.

The Dow, however, points down. This could be explained in two ways:

• The first is inflation. According to the FT, the Five Year Treasury Bond trades at 1.51%.  According to the WSJ, Five Year TIPS trade at 2.65%. Declining prices mean declining profits, which pushes down share prices. Declining prices coupled with increasing energy further pressures profits.
• The second - compounded with deflation - is the cost of debt. Fair to say, this fall was miserable for bond offerings. This past week was positive - companies actually went to market- weekly-bond-issues-ft-january-5-9-2009 - but for those companies able to issue debt, it is expensive, especially relative to treasuries -as mentioned before - of similar duration.

In 2009, the market predicts a start to economic recovery. That the fed funds effective rate will mirror the target rate and that the target rate will increase by end of 2009 shows positive economic activity. While 3-month LIBOR is low through 2009,  the actual cost of debt to firms - both in spreads and the growth/contraction in inflation - still puts long term pressure on economic growth.

The Yield Curve is increasing in discussion as a predictor of the US Economy.

First, in defense of the Yield Curve, it is a good predictor of future short term interest rates. Let’s take the UK and the US current short term Yield Curves, courtesy of the Financial Times.

The UK Yield Curve:

The US Yield Curve:

• The official UK Central Bank interest rate stands at 2.00%
• The Fed Funds target rate stands at 0.25%

With similar economies -troubled financial sectors, and nerve racking current account deficits -there is almost no question the UK will mimic its “special relationship” counter part and further slash interest rates to boost its economy. Hence, the UK curve slopes down in the short term.

Recovery:

Now, let’s read the yield curve tea leaves for the US economy:

• The Cleveland Fed votes yes
• Paul Krugman votes no

Paul is right. That the “effective rate” of Fed Funds trades at 0.14%, mirroring overnight Treasury Bills means the yield curve can only slope positively (The UK curve highlights why Paul is correct). Two years ago, life was much different.

• Fed Funds “effective rate” was 5.30%.
• Overnight 3m Treasury Bills traded close to 5.00%.

That the 30 Year Treasury Bond trades today at 2.81% shows a very weak economy, regardless of the slope of the curve. Further, it shows a long time until economic recovery. Larger economies require larger yields to balance the supply and demand of money.

When investors resume believing in corporate bonds, the yield curve will start to increase in slope. Treasuries will be sold and corporates will be bought. The key to economic recovery will not be the purchase of existing corporates - most of those were sold when yields were low. Rather, the key will be when new corporates are issued and issued cheaply (low yields). This will start putting new profits (more return on equity) back to companies for investment and further economic growth. Unfortunately, it has been a very light fall and continues to be a light winter for new debt issuances.

What will 2009 look like? This blog offers key spreads to examine routinely for signs of economic recovery. In chronological order

• The Fed Funds Effective vs. Target Spreads.
• The TED Spread
• LIBOR vs. Investment Grade Bonds

Fed Funds Spread

The Fed Funds Spread, the difference between the “Target Rate” and the “Effective Rate” for Federal Funds is essentially the measure of slack in the economy. Today, the Target Rate is set to 0.25% and the “Effective Rate” for overnight funds trades at 0.11%: banks can not find enough opportunities (or see too much risk) to lend. Instead, banks choose to keep excess funds within the Federal Reserve.

This is the first spread to watch. When the “effective rate” trades at the “target rate”, the economy is performing to its potential in the current interest rate environment.

The TED Spread

The TED Spread, the difference between three month LIBOR and three month US Treasuries, is essentially the measure of trust between the private and public sector. According to the Financial Times, three month LIBOR trades at 1.47%. Three-month Treasuries trade at 0.0014% (zero). That’s a big spread.

This spread can not converge until overnight LIBOR -which mirrors the Fed Funds “effective rate” - trades at the Fed Funds Target rate: Effective Rate vs. Target Rate convergence implies upward pressure on treasury yields, making overnight treasuries trade at a minimum of 0.0025%.  This is the start to redeeming trust in the private sector vs. the public sector.

LIBOR vs. Investment Grade Bonds

This spread measures competition and confidence in the private sector’s ability to earn income. Today, one year LIBOR trades at 2.09%. Reviewing Global Investment Grade Bonds from the Financial Times, most trade at ~6.00% yield.

global-investment-grade

This is the final spread that will show uptick in the economy. When this spread converges, trust in corporate earnings is restored: the public market respects corporate earnings enough to offer a suitable substitute to banks as a source of debt funding.

The LM Curve as Perspective

Reviewing the LM curve, demand for money equals the supply money at a given output and interest rate - in this case a zero interest rate environment.  Output could increase in a zero interest rate environment, with expansion of the money supply (as the Fed is currently doing) and with expansion of the government spending (as Obama is planning). Given we are in a contractionary economic environment, one could argue the US has only slid down the LM curve - money supply expansion has not worked -, awaiting a shift in the IS curve with new fiscal expansion.

However, a healthy economy has demand for money at positive rates. For this we look to the convergence of the spreads listed above.

As predicted, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) dropped its core interest rate by 75bp. A surprise to many, not to this blog. Enough bragging, these are scary times:

• The first reason is the FOMC statement: “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent”

A target range? This is the first time in recent memory the FOMC has stated it would establish a range and not a specific rate for its open market operations.  The minutes of this meeting will be very interesting:

• This blog will predict that the FOMC will admit it has lost control of the Fed Funds rate.

And that is very scary. Even though the Fed now pays interest on reserves, instead of only buying short term treasuries -, the actions to control the Fed Funds rate are not working: There is no demand to use capital in this economy: From the Financial Times:

• The Fed Fund rate sits at 0.12%, remaining unchanged from before the rate cut.
• Overnight LIBOR is 0.0115% (because the Fed pays interest on reserves)
• Overnight 3m Treasuries are 0.01%

Deflation:

Reserves sitting at the Fed have ballooned to almost $700 billion, comparable to envisioned TARP program.  Yet that money is parked there most likely because the Fed has been gobbling up Treasuries, driving the yields to zero. It is not going outward into the economy.

If you believe in Milton Friedman, then you believe the following:  Without lending activity and expansion of the monetary base - demonstrated by these spreads - then at best, the money supply is not keeping pace with the economy. Therefore, deflation.

It might be worse. If the expansion only sits in existing treasuries, and those treasuries are not new issues for new government programs - aka - the stimulus, then all we’ve done is increased the demand for treasuries and done nothing to expand the economy. Further, remember the taxpayer has only saved money from the latest treasury issuance. Other issues had more expensive yields. In a deflationary environment, this problem is only compounded. 

Until the stimulus is enacted, we must expect a deflationary environment for at least the short term. And that will cause the FOMC to continue its inabilty to control the Fed Funds rate.

The Fed Open Market Committee recently announced the extension of its December policy meeting from one to two days. With extra time, I argue the Fed should strongly consider cutting the target Federal Funds rate from 100 basis points (where it currently stands) to 25 basis points.

• As I predicted in Note Twelve, overnight LIBOR has converged upward, reaching the target Federal Funds rate of 1.00%. This is because the Federal Reserve now pays interest on all “excess reserves” banks now park at the Fed.
• A look at TIPS vs. Treasury Yields over the next year still shows wild expectations of deflation. Ergo, even though banks’ excess reserves receive a measly 1.00% by doing nothing, they make larger returns in this environment.
• Though the Fed is paying the target rate for excess reserves, the effective Federal Funds rate still trades at 59 basis points, according to the Financial Times. This is because our Government Sponsored Entities can not receive interest from the Fed on their parked capital. With no bank wanting to use their funds, the Federal Funds effective rate declines further from the target rate.

Most “Fed Watchers” expect a 50 basis point cut in December. As you can see, we are already there. A further cut of this magnitude are moot.

A semi-coordinated solution:

Between the Fed’s recent program and the Treasury’s TARP program, we are going to “borrow and spend” (or print and spend) a further 10% of GDP on “unclogging the system”.

• The TARP program should be injecting enough preferred equity capital to improve bank balance sheets. Yet lending has not picked up, as I argued in Note Twelve.
• I believe the new Fed program should help eventually reduce excess Government Sponsored Entity capital sitting at the Fed by buying mortgage backed securities guarantied by Fannie and Freddie. But it is too soon to tell.

Therefore, the FOMC needs to triangulate a strong signal, telling the banks what all pundits, bloggers, and congressional representatives have been saying for some time:

“Get your capital out of my bank and start lending!”

At 50 basis points, I have argued we would see no change from the current situation. Cutting the Federal Funds rate to 25 basis points should hopefully force a change in bank behavior. Fed rates would just be too low, even with deflation expectations, for opportunities not to be exciting. With it should force excess reserves out of the Fed and back into the the market at essentially risk-less rates.

Cut the rate to 25 basis points and Happy Holidays!

On a randomly selected May 16th, 2007, the Federal Funds rate was 5.25%. The effective rate (the rate bankers actually trade and negotiate at) was 5.29%. The actions taken by the Fed ensured its “target base rate” was the actual base rate for charged money. In short, this is our monetary system we take for granted, daily.

Before the credit crisis, how did the Fed ensure the spread between the target and effective rate stay so close to zero (if you know this, please skip down)?

• Banks are required to hold a certain amount of capital at the Federal Reserve. Prior to the crisis, a banking business model was to lend to outside parties. When lending exceeded required capital reserved at the Fed, banks had to borrow to repatriate to the Fed.
• The first choice of funds to borrow is capital held by other banks at the Federal Reserve.
• Should other banks charge too much for these funds, banks seeking capital could simply short treasuries.
• The Fed would mimicked this action,  buying and selling treasuries to ensure the market price for treasuries kept banks honest in pricing overnight lending.
• Sure enough, on May 16th, 2007, overnight LIBOR was 5.30%, one basis point from the effective rate and five basis points from the target rate.

Today, the story is quite different. The Federal Reserve’s target Federal Funds rate is 1.00%. The effective rate, (from the Financial Times), is 0.49%.

Two implications:

• Almost everyone surveyed, interviewed, and opining (including me) expects the Federal Reserve to slash the target rate from 1.00% to 0.50% in December. That decision is now moot.
• When the effective rate is nearly half the target rate and overnight LIBOR is 0.70%, in between the two rates, and yields on treasuries expiring on November 30th are 2.67%, there is a problem of illiquid markets, not responding correctly to simple centralized decisions attempting to steer the economy. To quote Senator Trent Lott, we are now “herding cats“.

How and why?

Reviewing the minutes from the last Federal Open Market Committee meeting and events of the “credit crisis” I find several issues:

• Randomly sampling daily market rates, the spread between target and effective rates was not large enough to be significant until after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, on September 15th, 2008.
• By September 22nd, 2008, while the target rate was still 2.00%, the effective rate was 1.79%. By the end of that week, the effective rate was 1.21%. In short, capital required to be in the Fed was not going anywhere: thus the start of banks truly refusing to lend.
• So, the Fed on October 6th, 2008 started paying interest on held capital, attempting to establish a floor on effective rates. Most important, the Fed started to pay interest on excess cash held above any requirements.
• But by October 10th, 2008, the policy wasn’t working. While the Fed slashed rates from 2.00% to 1.50%, the effective rate was 0.90%.
• By October 21st, the effective rate hovered below the floor rate established by the Fed on October 6th, 0.73%.
• So, the Fed again in two different announcements, the latest on November 5th, raised the interest rates paid on excess balances. As of today, any excess capital receives the target rate.

We’re still in the same position and I highlight what is explained beautifully in a recent Financial Times article:

• Most of today’s spread is explained because our Government Sponsored Entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, hold reserves at the Fed. Yet they can not receive interest payments, and thus must lend their capital at the effective rate.
• As banks are queasy regarding their own reserve requirements, they do not want to borrow entity funds for opportunities.  This capital simply sits at the Federal Reserve, depressing the target rate.

The Bottom Line:

• BANKS ARE NOT LENDING. If Banks were lending, there would be no need to pay interest on excess reserves.  That capital would be privately lent, to businesses large and small, old and new.

The Fed now has de-facto set a larger reserve requirement for banks, by paying interest on excess reserves. This is very dangerous.  That excess cash that should be in the market, growing our economy. (As I heard in business school again and again “putting capital to work”).

While overnight LIBOR has trended up since the Fed’s latest announcement (from 0.33% to 0.70% and most likely will continue up to 1.00%), the larger problem is this: For growth opportunities of the US Economy, the same target rate on a larger reserve pool of capital is equivalent to a higher rate on the official “reserve requirements”.

Therefore, when the Fed does cut rates to 50 basis points, what effect will it have?