As Congress released the second round of TARP funding this past week, anxiety grew that its original purpose is failing: banks are not lending.

To discern why, we must think about the relationship between the TARP funding requirements and Federal Reserve Monetary Policy.

With banks taking write downs during the fall of 2008, its plausible to assume TARP funding was the only new source of capital - all remaining bank liabilities and assets were matched after write downs, tied to existing economic activity. The only source of capital for new economic activity was TARP funding, now $700 billion. To give comfort to this assumption, add up the market capitalization of the largest US banks - far smaller than TARP.

By law,  TARP funding is preferred equity on a bank balance sheet, with a 5% annual dividend. Add on administrative costs, and a loan just to break even needs approximately 6%, just to service the taxpayer requirements of TARP. Yet through Open Market Operations, the US Ten Year Treasury currently yields 2.34%, according to the Financial Times and the effective Fed Funds rate is 0.18%. TARP funding requirements place this large source of new capital no where near this historically low yield curve, completely at odds with Open Market Operations.

Two years ago, overnight treasuries traded at 5%. When the economy grows at 3% per year, an inflation at 2%, a business owner merely switches on the lights to pay back a 5% interest bearing loan. Yet in today’s environment, 5% is expensive. In today’s environment -a ZIRP interest rate environment - a recessionary environment - a deflationary environment,  those willing to accept north of 5% (6%) is a classic adverse selection problem: The smart businesses horde cash as new cash is too expensive. The businesses accepting such a loan may not be able to pay it back.

Faced with the prospect of new bad loans, it is no surprise banks are not lending. They would rather preserve capital to plug foreseen bad loans in the coming year. Further, to achieve 5%, M&A is a preferred method, scooping up the right loan packages at the right price.

A Solution:

This page has long argued TARP dividends should be a rolling average of the yield on treasury bills/notes - the opportunity cost of taxpayers funding the banks. If yields are low, economic activity is weak, keeping dividend payments manageable. If yields are higher, (assuming no runaway inflation) economic activity has increased as treasuries were sold for corporates, again making dividend payments manageable. We hope the new administration makes this change.

It is time to take stock of where the market sees the economy moving in 2009. Let’s examine

• Overnight Index Swap (OIS) Futures - tracking the effective Federal Funds rate
• Three-Month Eurodollar Futures - tracking three month LIBOR - the base private lending rate
• Oil Futures - tracking energy
• Dow Futures tracking industrial performance

2009-economic-indicators1

Let’s start with the base of the economy, the effective Fed Funds rate. By reviewing OIS Futures, the Market believes by the fall of 2009, the Fed will have increased the target funds rate to 0.5%. Further, economic activity will be strong enough that the effective rate will mirror the target rate by both the midyear and by the end of the year. Treasuries expiring in December 2009 yield 0.41%, according to the Wall St. Journal, close to the effective funds rate Dec-09 futures.

Three Month Eurodollar futures, a mirroring instrument to 3 month LIBOR trading on the CME state marginal increases in lending cost.  Considering treasuries expiring in March 2010 yield 0.4% (compared to treasuries expiring in December 2009), there is still a very high TED Spread - the private capital trust spread -by the end of 2009.

Oil futures-according to the Wall St. Journal-  show robust increases in energy cost. Further, according to the WSJ, there is no change in Dollar futures against a world currency basket through 2009. This shows a pickup in world oil demand, potentially a pickup in global economic growth.

The Dow, however, points down. This could be explained in two ways:

• The first is inflation. According to the FT, the Five Year Treasury Bond trades at 1.51%.  According to the WSJ, Five Year TIPS trade at 2.65%. Declining prices mean declining profits, which pushes down share prices. Declining prices coupled with increasing energy further pressures profits.
• The second - compounded with deflation - is the cost of debt. Fair to say, this fall was miserable for bond offerings. This past week was positive - companies actually went to market- weekly-bond-issues-ft-january-5-9-2009 - but for those companies able to issue debt, it is expensive, especially relative to treasuries -as mentioned before - of similar duration.

In 2009, the market predicts a start to economic recovery. That the fed funds effective rate will mirror the target rate and that the target rate will increase by end of 2009 shows positive economic activity. While 3-month LIBOR is low through 2009,  the actual cost of debt to firms - both in spreads and the growth/contraction in inflation - still puts long term pressure on economic growth.

Much concern exists over Obama’s proposal to make tax cuts a major portion of fiscal stimulus.  Through a tax cut, we (the government) are increasing the income of those still employed. Hopefully, tax savings will buy goods and services, increasing GDP. In today’s environment, we’re not enacting a stimulus to buy goods, we’re enacting a stimulus to buy jobs.

GDP = government spending + investment + consumption + net exports. The marginal dollars in a tax cut will either be saved or spent.

While savings should be encouraged in the long term, a savings glut currently exists. Fed Funds rate trades near zero, while cash reserves within the Fed have ballooned.

More damaging, marginal spending could be directed at imported goods. From Martin Wolf to Warren Buffet, many shudder at no improvement in our trade balances. Dollars used for imports are either locked up as foreign reserves or exchanged for investments in future US cash flows. Those future cash flows are either US tax receipts or profits distributed as interest or dividends. Those tax receipts could have put new teachers in the class room. Those profits could have built new factories. Those cash flows will never to be re-invested in the US.

By definition then, an increasing current account deficit means the same standard of living - GDP - costs more. If this is not the purest form of inflation, I do not know what is.

Many believe  too great a mismatch exists between jobs lost and jobs needed for “shovel ready”.  Cokie Roberts on “This Week” opined on finance professionals helping on infrastructure: “Well maybe instead of going to their personal trainers, they can actually get out there and start digging.”

The purchase of infrastructure projects buys jobs across the food chain.  Almost every project will go out for private competitive tender. Forget defunct residential home construction (shovel ready employees), companies bidding will require talent to prepare bids, obtain financing, manage payroll, and review costs. Every contract guarantied by the government (state or federal) will give lenders the confidence to finance, spurring new growth.

The long term benefits (aside from jobs) are then improved transportation, reduced energy costs and reduction of barriers to education. Thus reduction of risks for future runaway inflation - those risks prevalent in increasing current account deficits. Faith in government is presently difficult yet now we must make our congress the direct investors of last resort.

The Yield Curve is increasing in discussion as a predictor of the US Economy.

First, in defense of the Yield Curve, it is a good predictor of future short term interest rates. Let’s take the UK and the US current short term Yield Curves, courtesy of the Financial Times.

The UK Yield Curve:

The US Yield Curve:

• The official UK Central Bank interest rate stands at 2.00%
• The Fed Funds target rate stands at 0.25%

With similar economies -troubled financial sectors, and nerve racking current account deficits -there is almost no question the UK will mimic its “special relationship” counter part and further slash interest rates to boost its economy. Hence, the UK curve slopes down in the short term.

Recovery:

Now, let’s read the yield curve tea leaves for the US economy:

• The Cleveland Fed votes yes
• Paul Krugman votes no

Paul is right. That the “effective rate” of Fed Funds trades at 0.14%, mirroring overnight Treasury Bills means the yield curve can only slope positively (The UK curve highlights why Paul is correct). Two years ago, life was much different.

• Fed Funds “effective rate” was 5.30%.
• Overnight 3m Treasury Bills traded close to 5.00%.

That the 30 Year Treasury Bond trades today at 2.81% shows a very weak economy, regardless of the slope of the curve. Further, it shows a long time until economic recovery. Larger economies require larger yields to balance the supply and demand of money.

When investors resume believing in corporate bonds, the yield curve will start to increase in slope. Treasuries will be sold and corporates will be bought. The key to economic recovery will not be the purchase of existing corporates - most of those were sold when yields were low. Rather, the key will be when new corporates are issued and issued cheaply (low yields). This will start putting new profits (more return on equity) back to companies for investment and further economic growth. Unfortunately, it has been a very light fall and continues to be a light winter for new debt issuances.

As predicted, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) dropped its core interest rate by 75bp. A surprise to many, not to this blog. Enough bragging, these are scary times:

• The first reason is the FOMC statement: “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent”

A target range? This is the first time in recent memory the FOMC has stated it would establish a range and not a specific rate for its open market operations.  The minutes of this meeting will be very interesting:

• This blog will predict that the FOMC will admit it has lost control of the Fed Funds rate.

And that is very scary. Even though the Fed now pays interest on reserves, instead of only buying short term treasuries -, the actions to control the Fed Funds rate are not working: There is no demand to use capital in this economy: From the Financial Times:

• The Fed Fund rate sits at 0.12%, remaining unchanged from before the rate cut.
• Overnight LIBOR is 0.0115% (because the Fed pays interest on reserves)
• Overnight 3m Treasuries are 0.01%

Deflation:

Reserves sitting at the Fed have ballooned to almost $700 billion, comparable to envisioned TARP program.  Yet that money is parked there most likely because the Fed has been gobbling up Treasuries, driving the yields to zero. It is not going outward into the economy.

If you believe in Milton Friedman, then you believe the following:  Without lending activity and expansion of the monetary base - demonstrated by these spreads - then at best, the money supply is not keeping pace with the economy. Therefore, deflation.

It might be worse. If the expansion only sits in existing treasuries, and those treasuries are not new issues for new government programs - aka - the stimulus, then all we’ve done is increased the demand for treasuries and done nothing to expand the economy. Further, remember the taxpayer has only saved money from the latest treasury issuance. Other issues had more expensive yields. In a deflationary environment, this problem is only compounded. 

Until the stimulus is enacted, we must expect a deflationary environment for at least the short term. And that will cause the FOMC to continue its inabilty to control the Fed Funds rate.

Robert Shiller, in his book The Subprime Solution offers a risk management tool for governments. It is a “Trill” and it pays a perpetual share of GDP.

As GDP increases, the instrument pays a higher coupon. During a recession, it pays less. Quite the floating instrument. Shiller assumes each share would pay roughly $15, believing perpetual GDP would average $15 trillion annually. (Hence the “Trill”). Each Trill would be worth roughly $300. This assumes the US Risk Free rate is 5%. The risk-less rate of the US economy is 5%.

The “Risk” that is managed is during hard times, the government obviously owes less in debt service costs. In times of plenty, the government can afford to pay more. But in bad times, governments would have more cash on hand to handle a crisis (such as today).

The Pros.

• This instrument allows the market to truly estimate GDP growth. In some ways, the instrument is worth issuing simply to have a market view (a great view) of GDP growth.
• One now has the ability- with TIPS, Treasuries, and Trills- to estimate real GDP growth given  market views.
• Instead of perpetual Instruments, it could be more beneficial to issue “Trills” expiring annually, similar to TIPS and Treasuries. This way, one could have the market truly predicting GDP growth.

The Reasons for Pause:

• Reviewing the LM curve, as output grows, interest rates rise. As the economy falters, interest rates fall. Even in today’s crisis, this relationship holds true. The Trill’s desired hedge already exists. Further, this means the government has the ability to re-finance higher yielding paper in tougher times.
• The Hedge: Shiller’s main reason for the GDP indexed Trill is to provide government “room to spare” should a contraction occur. As GDP declines, so would tax receipts, lowering government revenue. It then is hard to argue the Government would have spare cash to attack a crisis.
• Other Financings: GDP, remember, is defined as Consumption + Investment + Government Expenditure + Net Exports. GDP could remain stable year on year, but Imports could still rise. In this example, Investment (Foreign Direct Investment) remains unchanged meaning the Current Account Deficit is in the form of domestic bonds and stocks, essentially payments to foreigners from US income. Trill payments could remain unchanged, but the country as a whole would pay more to maintain the same standard of living (in the short run).

Robert Shiller is one of our smartest thinkers on real property. Let’s work on the Trill as it has definite promise as a positive instrument for US Debt.

The Treasury can choose how to finance this purchase.

First though, the plan gives us insight into when Treasury foresees the US Economy recovering. If all preferred shares are callable in three years, but only redeemable through equity (and not debt) prior to, then in essence, Treasury believes we will not fully calm the credit markets until three years from now.

At present, The Treasury issues 2 Years, 5 Years, and 10 Years. Yet Treasury must know most banks will call the preferred shares by year five when the dividend percentage increases from 5% to 9%.

Yet how many banks will take out the preferred shares prior to year three? Probably not many.

The safest debt instrument then is a five year treasury debt instrument. Here is why:

• The Yield on Five Year Treasuries is 2.609%, cheap money.

• No refinance risk. The preferred shares are retired back piece by piece through the next five years. While there is a chance of buying back treasuries at a premium when the debt is retired, the debt is so cheap; this problem is hard to imagine.

• Isolates the problem to the current administration. No doubt, models exist predicting when various banks will pay back the preferred shares, estimating duration and a possible combination of two year debt, five year debt and accept some refinance risk if funding is further needed.

Since the First Note, The Government’s Credit Committee, with members Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, and Richard Shelby took more time to get comfortable with Hank Paulson’s proposal.

While the debate in Washington raged on, one month LIBOR increased from 3.19% to 3.70%. Three month LIBOR increased from 3.21% to 3.76%. Commercial Paper increased from 2.50% to 2.70%. Letter of Credit facilities are not expanding. Essentially the way balance sheets are funded is grinding to a halt.

So, how could most corporations raise capital faced with this problem? One answer would be to short treasury securities of the same duration. Simply borrowing the securities, selling them into the market for cash, with the promise to deliver those securities later would do the job.

And why not? Treasury securities expiring on Dec 31 are yielding a paltry 1.02%. Treasury securities expiring on Dec 15 are yielding .68%. Would a betting man believe yields would increase or decrease in the next week? Considering inflation increased over the past year and that the US will sell an additional $700 Billion of debt into the market, yields will most certainly rise.

So, given the demand to short and the rational argument that yields will increase, the fact that the spread is so significant is in fact very significant. Money that normally would buy commercial paper and be infused into interbank offerings is now moving to “quality”. That quality is the United States government backed bonds and notes.

We can quickly examine the balance sheet and income statement of the US Government to know the following:

1. Liabilities just increased by close to $1 trillion, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG and the proposed bailout.
2. Projected top line tax revenue is expected to decline as housing values sink and oil relief is still far off.
3. Inflation is still a huge risk.

So how is this quality? The simple answer is that it is not. And if the US Government is not quality, then imagine how much mistrust is in the private market right now. And this is exactly why those shorting trades are not occurring and not helping to re-balance the spread, lowering TED.

For all of 2008 until now, we heard and read the financial sector was amuck, but corporate American remained strong. Yet now, we are conceivably in a macro-economic death-spiral.

1. If companies continue to be faced with high interest rates and refusal of credit, they will stop expanding.
2. Further, for all those companies who did not hedge exposure (and with lack of quality counter-parties, it is conceivable this is a lot), they will be forced to pay higher rates of interest now on all existing loans and notes.
3. To meet higher rates, companies will have to cut expenses, essentially wages. Reductions of wages will depress the economy further.
4. Consumer spending will continue to decline, making more companies unable to meet existing obligations.
5. Credit spreads will increase for fear of company credit and the cycle will continue.

This week will be as wild as the last one….

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson aka Hank, AKA King Henry, the former chairman of Goldman Sachs appeared on Meet the Press this Sunday. He said “Last week there were times when the capital markets or credit markets were frozen.”

Was he lying?

No. Hank was telling the truth.

Let’s look at markets for short term money. Why? When prices for short term money move, prices for other money must concurrently move. Starting on Monday, September 15^th, when Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, declared bankruptcy, one month LIBOR rates for money were 2.49%. Essentially, the base opportunity cost of private investing for one month was 2.49% on an annualized basis. While the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Index swooned wildly, one month LIBOR ticked up every day, closing on Friday at 3.19%. In other words, the private sector opportunity cost of efficient investment swooned by 33% in five business days.

Why? Did inflation increase? Did oil prices increase? No. None of this occurred. What did occur was the increased need for cash on banks’ balance sheets. Faced with dramatic uncertainty answering questions such as :

• what do we own? and
• what do our competitors own?

The best answer every bank came to was “don’t loan and keep cash for our own security”.

But it wasn’t just LIBOR that increased ….

Short term 30-Day Commercial Paper, the basic note that keeps corporation engines oiled increased from 2.2 to 2.5%. And to show how much the average American did not trust the solvency of the banks (rightly so if all their business model is now preserving cash and not efficiently loaning cash), One Month Certificate of Deposits increased from 2.51% to 5.0% in the same span of days this week. In other words, if you – dear reader - had a goal of opening a CD last Monday, got sick, and went to the bank on Friday, your rate of return would have doubled.

Is this unheard of?

I think so. If we examine the changes in the same rates from randomly June 4 to June 8, 2007 there was no change in LIBOR rates. If we examine the same rates randomly from July 16 to July 20, 2007 again, no change again. LIBOR held steady at 5.32%. What was the Fed Funds discount rate then? 5.25%. Historically, this has been the case: a strong convergence of the two rates.

What was the Fed Funds rate this week? 2.00%.

Let’s take a deep breath: 3.19% one month LIBOR vs. 2.00% Fed Funds Target Rate means private sector’s unease forced efficient private sector rates north of 50% above the “discount rate”. Given this over 100 basis point difference in discount rate money vs. private credit, Hank was most certainly telling the truth.

What could be next?

This week will be as wild as last week.