Category — The Bailout

As Congress released the second round of TARP funding this past week, anxiety grew that its original purpose is failing: banks are not lending.

To discern why, we must think about the relationship between the TARP funding requirements and Federal Reserve Monetary Policy.

With banks taking write downs during the fall of 2008, its plausible to assume TARP funding was the only new source of capital - all remaining bank liabilities and assets were matched after write downs, tied to existing economic activity. The only source of capital for new economic activity was TARP funding, now $700 billion. To give comfort to this assumption, add up the market capitalization of the largest US banks - far smaller than TARP.

By law,  TARP funding is preferred equity on a bank balance sheet, with a 5% annual dividend. Add on administrative costs, and a loan just to break even needs approximately 6%, just to service the taxpayer requirements of TARP. Yet through Open Market Operations, the US Ten Year Treasury currently yields 2.34%, according to the Financial Times and the effective Fed Funds rate is 0.18%. TARP funding requirements place this large source of new capital no where near this historically low yield curve, completely at odds with Open Market Operations.

Two years ago, overnight treasuries traded at 5%. When the economy grows at 3% per year, an inflation at 2%, a business owner merely switches on the lights to pay back a 5% interest bearing loan. Yet in today’s environment, 5% is expensive. In today’s environment -a ZIRP interest rate environment - a recessionary environment - a deflationary environment,  those willing to accept north of 5% (6%) is a classic adverse selection problem: The smart businesses horde cash as new cash is too expensive. The businesses accepting such a loan may not be able to pay it back.

Faced with the prospect of new bad loans, it is no surprise banks are not lending. They would rather preserve capital to plug foreseen bad loans in the coming year. Further, to achieve 5%, M&A is a preferred method, scooping up the right loan packages at the right price.

A Solution:

This page has long argued TARP dividends should be a rolling average of the yield on treasury bills/notes - the opportunity cost of taxpayers funding the banks. If yields are low, economic activity is weak, keeping dividend payments manageable. If yields are higher, (assuming no runaway inflation) economic activity has increased as treasuries were sold for corporates, again making dividend payments manageable. We hope the new administration makes this change.

What will 2009 look like? This blog offers key spreads to examine routinely for signs of economic recovery. In chronological order

• The Fed Funds Effective vs. Target Spreads.
• The TED Spread
• LIBOR vs. Investment Grade Bonds

Fed Funds Spread

The Fed Funds Spread, the difference between the “Target Rate” and the “Effective Rate” for Federal Funds is essentially the measure of slack in the economy. Today, the Target Rate is set to 0.25% and the “Effective Rate” for overnight funds trades at 0.11%: banks can not find enough opportunities (or see too much risk) to lend. Instead, banks choose to keep excess funds within the Federal Reserve.

This is the first spread to watch. When the “effective rate” trades at the “target rate”, the economy is performing to its potential in the current interest rate environment.

The TED Spread

The TED Spread, the difference between three month LIBOR and three month US Treasuries, is essentially the measure of trust between the private and public sector. According to the Financial Times, three month LIBOR trades at 1.47%. Three-month Treasuries trade at 0.0014% (zero). That’s a big spread.

This spread can not converge until overnight LIBOR -which mirrors the Fed Funds “effective rate” - trades at the Fed Funds Target rate: Effective Rate vs. Target Rate convergence implies upward pressure on treasury yields, making overnight treasuries trade at a minimum of 0.0025%.  This is the start to redeeming trust in the private sector vs. the public sector.

LIBOR vs. Investment Grade Bonds

This spread measures competition and confidence in the private sector’s ability to earn income. Today, one year LIBOR trades at 2.09%. Reviewing Global Investment Grade Bonds from the Financial Times, most trade at ~6.00% yield.

global-investment-grade

This is the final spread that will show uptick in the economy. When this spread converges, trust in corporate earnings is restored: the public market respects corporate earnings enough to offer a suitable substitute to banks as a source of debt funding.

The LM Curve as Perspective

Reviewing the LM curve, demand for money equals the supply money at a given output and interest rate - in this case a zero interest rate environment.  Output could increase in a zero interest rate environment, with expansion of the money supply (as the Fed is currently doing) and with expansion of the government spending (as Obama is planning). Given we are in a contractionary economic environment, one could argue the US has only slid down the LM curve - money supply expansion has not worked -, awaiting a shift in the IS curve with new fiscal expansion.

However, a healthy economy has demand for money at positive rates. For this we look to the convergence of the spreads listed above.

This blog has focused on the FDIC insurance program guaranteeing newly issued bank debt.

Here is why:

Reviewing the facets of the right hand of the balance sheet, the taxpayer and printing press are very active.

• Short Term Liabilities, Commercial Paper - Guarantor - The Fed
• Short Term, Long Term Debt - Guarantor - The FDIC
• Preferred Equity - The Treasury

This blog believes the FDIC program is the most powerful government program helping banks currently expand credit.

A lot has been written on Credit Default Swaps. These unregulated instruments were instrumental in causing a crisis of credit, in turn causing a crisis of economic performance.

Let’s examine where these two issues meet: The Fee the FDIC charges banks to guarantee their new debt. This fee is the Credit Default Swap the FDIC (aka, the US Taxpayer) sells to guarantee new bank debt (from Goldman Sachs, Morgan Stanley to John Deere Capital).

What should the price of the swap be? Evidence from one source this month says as high as 7% or 700 bp annually of principal. The FDIC begs to differ. For any debt issued and set to expire more than a year from now, the FDIC is selling a CDS for 100bp, or an annual 1% of principal. While the CDS market is not transparent enough to determine the true price, it is fair to say 1% is cheap, or subsidized.

Is this enough? Is it even necessary to charge a fee or subsidize the entire swap?

• The FDIC states this program will be of no cost to the taxpayer.

• Right now, the FDIC has ~$33.4 billion in the bank, to guarantee this program as well as all accounts now $250,000 or less.

• Let’s assume most outstanding bonds covenants are written to ensure seniority is universally established in the event of a default.

• For the big banks, would the taxpayer just guarantee the debt sold with the FDIC swap? Comparing Lehman to Citi, the answer is probably not.

• Finally, given the lack of public savings, the taxpayer will have to return to the debt market should any bailout be necessary.

Is the FDIC program helping to fuel cheap credit? Yes. But given the US Fiscal Condition and its new precident of response to a crisis, the taxpayer should realize it is selling underfunded Credit Default Swaps just like the banks it now stands behind.

As predicted, the Federal Reserve Open Market Committee (FOMC) dropped its core interest rate by 75bp. A surprise to many, not to this blog. Enough bragging, these are scary times:

• The first reason is the FOMC statement: “The Federal Open Market Committee decided today to establish a target range for the federal funds rate of 0 to 1/4 percent”

A target range? This is the first time in recent memory the FOMC has stated it would establish a range and not a specific rate for its open market operations.  The minutes of this meeting will be very interesting:

• This blog will predict that the FOMC will admit it has lost control of the Fed Funds rate.

And that is very scary. Even though the Fed now pays interest on reserves, instead of only buying short term treasuries -, the actions to control the Fed Funds rate are not working: There is no demand to use capital in this economy: From the Financial Times:

• The Fed Fund rate sits at 0.12%, remaining unchanged from before the rate cut.
• Overnight LIBOR is 0.0115% (because the Fed pays interest on reserves)
• Overnight 3m Treasuries are 0.01%

Deflation:

Reserves sitting at the Fed have ballooned to almost $700 billion, comparable to envisioned TARP program.  Yet that money is parked there most likely because the Fed has been gobbling up Treasuries, driving the yields to zero. It is not going outward into the economy.

If you believe in Milton Friedman, then you believe the following:  Without lending activity and expansion of the monetary base - demonstrated by these spreads - then at best, the money supply is not keeping pace with the economy. Therefore, deflation.

It might be worse. If the expansion only sits in existing treasuries, and those treasuries are not new issues for new government programs - aka - the stimulus, then all we’ve done is increased the demand for treasuries and done nothing to expand the economy. Further, remember the taxpayer has only saved money from the latest treasury issuance. Other issues had more expensive yields. In a deflationary environment, this problem is only compounded. 

Until the stimulus is enacted, we must expect a deflationary environment for at least the short term. And that will cause the FOMC to continue its inabilty to control the Fed Funds rate.

As a follow up to Note 15, this week banks in the US issued $23.8 Billion more in FDIC (taxpayer backed) debt. This is on top of the roughly $17 billion issued last week. The total amounts exceed the reserves the FDIC has in the bank. Looking at where other debt is trading for major banks, the FDIC (the taxpayer) is subsidizing each bank (B of A, GS, Morgan Stanley, JP Morgan, etc.) by approximately 300 basis points.

First off, Happy Thanksgiving to you and yours!

Last week Goldman Sachs became the first “bank” to float a bond issue guaranteed by the FDIC.   A look at the weekly debt issues from the Financial Times shows US banks springing back into action, all issuing FDIC guaranteed debt. As I can tell, these are the first bond issues of any major financial institution in Dollars since Lehman’s declaration of bankruptcy.

(For the purposes of this post, all noted bonds sold close enough to par that coupon yields as first order approximations for true yields will suffice. Sorry Professor Jenter!)

• Goldman Sachs issued $5 billion due in June 2012 yielding 3.25%
• Morgan Stanley issued $2.25 billion due in Dec 2010 yielding 2.90% and $2.5 billion expiring in December 2011 3.25% and $1 billion due in June 2011, half of which has a known floating rate of   1 month LIBOR plus 74 bp.
• JP Morgan issued $5 billion due in December 2011 yielding 3.125% and $1billion due in December 2010 with floating rate interest of 3 month LIBOR plus 50bp .

Thanks to the FDIC guarantee, the yields on these bonds are very low, making them very favorable for the issuing banks. Yet the FDIC has only $34.6 billion in funds for this purpose or general insurance on accounts up to $250,000.

I would argue the FDIC’s funds are too small to take on insuring now larger accounts as well as guaranteeing bank bonds. So, the taxpayer is on the hook for  $16.75 billion of new bank debt.

Let’s put that amount in perspective.

• GM, Ford, and Chrysler are asking for $25 billion
• The net CDS exposure on GM and Ford amounts to $9.6 billion
• As I wrote in Note Four A, as part of the TARP program, the tax payer is due to receive roughly $18 billion in dividends from the first $250 billion the Treasury is injecting as preferred equity capital into these same banks.
• John McCain railed against earmarks all campaign long. President Elect Barack Obama said earmarks amount to $18 billion a year.

Further, it is important to compare the incredibly low yields on these bonds:

• In the week of November 7, 2008 Ireland, a sovereign euro denominated nation that stated it would guarantee all deposits from six of its largest financial institutions, sold 4 billion of euro debt, due in November 2011, yielding 4.0%

And during the Year of Cheap Credit, Fall of 2006-Spring of 2007 (without any FDIC backing)

• In September of 2006, Goldman Sachs issued 750 million euros due in October, 2021 yielding 4.75%
• In September of 2006, Citi issued 1.25 billion euros due in October, 2013 yielding 3.95%
• In February of 2007, three banks no longer in existence in the same form issued long duration debt:

1. Wachovia issued 1 billion euros due in February 2014 yielding 3 month Euro LIBOR plus 15 bp.
2. Lehman Brothers issued 1 billion euros due in March, 2019 yielding 4.625%
3. Merrill Lynch issued 1 billion euros due in February , 2012 yielding 3 month Euro LIBOR plus 18 bp.

Side Note: it is amazing reviewing that year of cheap credit how few bonds were issued in dollars relative to Euros and Sterling. It made me believe Mayor Mike Bloomberg was right to worry New York was losing out as the capital of global finance.

IN SUM: This is new uncharted waters for the US Taxpayer. What if one of the banks uses the funding to underwrite new acquisitions that create “synergies” resulting in laid off workers? What if the funds are used  to lever up a commodities bet? I do not believe banks raised enough capital to make single bets of that systemic threatening magnitude, but the overall point is this:

• In large part, banks and autos are short term inelastic industries. Without a bank, its hard to save currency and its hard to do commerce. Without a car in the USA, its hard to travel from point A to B.
• There are plenty of foreign banks and plenty of foreign car companies.
• I reckon between the FDIC, Treasury and Fed plans, we are spending close or guaranteeing close to $2 trillion, ~15% of GDP, for our private sector banking industry. While congress has made “noises” on insufficient bank lending, there is no plan attached to this funding. Yet produce autos and ask for $25 billion, you’d better have a plan.
• Bottom line for CEOs learning how to manage through a future crises: It sure pays to be the industry first in line for help.

Since last we spoke, the government invested $125 billion into the nine biggest banks and will invest $125 billion into an additional number of banks, potentially other financial companies. The investments, up to $25 billion or 3% of risk weighted assets into any specific company, are supposed to ease liquidity issues, and reduce cost of funds between banks.

For Taxpayers, the returns depend on your view.

• The terms of the treasury (on behalf of the tax-payer) investment are a dividend of 5% of invested capital.
• The preferred share investment is callable anytime after three years.
• Should the banks issue new equity prior to three years, they can buy out the tax-payer at par with that funding. In essence, any current equity owner is diluted regardless.

The taxpayer does not have any savings (found in lack in government surplus), so it must raise debt to fund the bank bailout.

Examining two and five year treasury yields, they are priced at 1.555% and 2.609%. respectively.  Assuming the Treasury Department does the right thing (See Note Four A), it will sell five year debt to finance the bailout.

Doing the math, paying 2.609% to receive 5% seems like a good deal. It does make a lot of arguments against it seem not as compelling.

Here’s another way to look at the deal though.

Assume the treasury invests up to $250 Billion, the returns over three years are $6 Billion a year. Enough to pay for approximately one year of pork projects John McCain rails against continuously.

Is this then a good investment? You decide.

The Treasury can choose how to finance this purchase.

First though, the plan gives us insight into when Treasury foresees the US Economy recovering. If all preferred shares are callable in three years, but only redeemable through equity (and not debt) prior to, then in essence, Treasury believes we will not fully calm the credit markets until three years from now.

At present, The Treasury issues 2 Years, 5 Years, and 10 Years. Yet Treasury must know most banks will call the preferred shares by year five when the dividend percentage increases from 5% to 9%.

Yet how many banks will take out the preferred shares prior to year three? Probably not many.

The safest debt instrument then is a five year treasury debt instrument. Here is why:

• The Yield on Five Year Treasuries is 2.609%, cheap money.

• No refinance risk. The preferred shares are retired back piece by piece through the next five years. While there is a chance of buying back treasuries at a premium when the debt is retired, the debt is so cheap; this problem is hard to imagine.

• Isolates the problem to the current administration. No doubt, models exist predicting when various banks will pay back the preferred shares, estimating duration and a possible combination of two year debt, five year debt and accept some refinance risk if funding is further needed.

Hank Paulson is a graduate of Harvard Business School, my cross town rival. (I went to MIT Sloan).

As 60 minutes shadowed him prior to the Congressional Approval of his bill, he was a leader handling a crisis:

1. Keep calm
2. Keep the solution simple
3. Execute the simple solution

So he must have known using the Treasury Department to buy asset back securities would be challenging, painful, and timely.

Today, the Financial Times, the New York Times, and the Wall Street Journal are all reporting the Treasury Department is considering equity stakes in banks, rather than purchasing asset backed purchases.

This solution, proposed and scoped early last week in our Third Note, is simpler and more effective.

1. Take equity ownership,
2. Ease capital constraints,
3. Start working through this mess.

On Timing, Hank has no choice.

If a bank asked you for a debt investment of 10 years, would you say yes? At what rate? Most banks are having real problems rolling over their long term debt. Sans long term debt, banks must use short term LIBOR, crippling our working capital system.

Yesterday, US Overnight LIBOR closed at 5.375%, up 1.48% for the day.

Hank, it is time to hit the reset button.