Posts from — November 2008

The Fed Open Market Committee recently announced the extension of its December policy meeting from one to two days. With extra time, I argue the Fed should strongly consider cutting the target Federal Funds rate from 100 basis points (where it currently stands) to 25 basis points.

• As I predicted in Note Twelve, overnight LIBOR has converged upward, reaching the target Federal Funds rate of 1.00%. This is because the Federal Reserve now pays interest on all “excess reserves” banks now park at the Fed.
• A look at TIPS vs. Treasury Yields over the next year still shows wild expectations of deflation. Ergo, even though banks’ excess reserves receive a measly 1.00% by doing nothing, they make larger returns in this environment.
• Though the Fed is paying the target rate for excess reserves, the effective Federal Funds rate still trades at 59 basis points, according to the Financial Times. This is because our Government Sponsored Entities can not receive interest from the Fed on their parked capital. With no bank wanting to use their funds, the Federal Funds effective rate declines further from the target rate.

Most “Fed Watchers” expect a 50 basis point cut in December. As you can see, we are already there. A further cut of this magnitude are moot.

A semi-coordinated solution:

Between the Fed’s recent program and the Treasury’s TARP program, we are going to “borrow and spend” (or print and spend) a further 10% of GDP on “unclogging the system”.

• The TARP program should be injecting enough preferred equity capital to improve bank balance sheets. Yet lending has not picked up, as I argued in Note Twelve.
• I believe the new Fed program should help eventually reduce excess Government Sponsored Entity capital sitting at the Fed by buying mortgage backed securities guarantied by Fannie and Freddie. But it is too soon to tell.

Therefore, the FOMC needs to triangulate a strong signal, telling the banks what all pundits, bloggers, and congressional representatives have been saying for some time:

“Get your capital out of my bank and start lending!”

At 50 basis points, I have argued we would see no change from the current situation. Cutting the Federal Funds rate to 25 basis points should hopefully force a change in bank behavior. Fed rates would just be too low, even with deflation expectations, for opportunities not to be exciting. With it should force excess reserves out of the Fed and back into the the market at essentially risk-less rates.

Cut the rate to 25 basis points and Happy Holidays!

On a randomly selected May 16th, 2007, the Federal Funds rate was 5.25%. The effective rate (the rate bankers actually trade and negotiate at) was 5.29%. The actions taken by the Fed ensured its “target base rate” was the actual base rate for charged money. In short, this is our monetary system we take for granted, daily.

Before the credit crisis, how did the Fed ensure the spread between the target and effective rate stay so close to zero (if you know this, please skip down)?

• Banks are required to hold a certain amount of capital at the Federal Reserve. Prior to the crisis, a banking business model was to lend to outside parties. When lending exceeded required capital reserved at the Fed, banks had to borrow to repatriate to the Fed.
• The first choice of funds to borrow is capital held by other banks at the Federal Reserve.
• Should other banks charge too much for these funds, banks seeking capital could simply short treasuries.
• The Fed would mimicked this action,  buying and selling treasuries to ensure the market price for treasuries kept banks honest in pricing overnight lending.
• Sure enough, on May 16th, 2007, overnight LIBOR was 5.30%, one basis point from the effective rate and five basis points from the target rate.

Today, the story is quite different. The Federal Reserve’s target Federal Funds rate is 1.00%. The effective rate, (from the Financial Times), is 0.49%.

Two implications:

• Almost everyone surveyed, interviewed, and opining (including me) expects the Federal Reserve to slash the target rate from 1.00% to 0.50% in December. That decision is now moot.
• When the effective rate is nearly half the target rate and overnight LIBOR is 0.70%, in between the two rates, and yields on treasuries expiring on November 30th are 2.67%, there is a problem of illiquid markets, not responding correctly to simple centralized decisions attempting to steer the economy. To quote Senator Trent Lott, we are now “herding cats“.

How and why?

Reviewing the minutes from the last Federal Open Market Committee meeting and events of the “credit crisis” I find several issues:

• Randomly sampling daily market rates, the spread between target and effective rates was not large enough to be significant until after the bankruptcy of Lehman Brothers, on September 15th, 2008.
• By September 22nd, 2008, while the target rate was still 2.00%, the effective rate was 1.79%. By the end of that week, the effective rate was 1.21%. In short, capital required to be in the Fed was not going anywhere: thus the start of banks truly refusing to lend.
• So, the Fed on October 6th, 2008 started paying interest on held capital, attempting to establish a floor on effective rates. Most important, the Fed started to pay interest on excess cash held above any requirements.
• But by October 10th, 2008, the policy wasn’t working. While the Fed slashed rates from 2.00% to 1.50%, the effective rate was 0.90%.
• By October 21st, the effective rate hovered below the floor rate established by the Fed on October 6th, 0.73%.
• So, the Fed again in two different announcements, the latest on November 5th, raised the interest rates paid on excess balances. As of today, any excess capital receives the target rate.

We’re still in the same position and I highlight what is explained beautifully in a recent Financial Times article:

• Most of today’s spread is explained because our Government Sponsored Entities, Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac, hold reserves at the Fed. Yet they can not receive interest payments, and thus must lend their capital at the effective rate.
• As banks are queasy regarding their own reserve requirements, they do not want to borrow entity funds for opportunities.  This capital simply sits at the Federal Reserve, depressing the target rate.

The Bottom Line:

• BANKS ARE NOT LENDING. If Banks were lending, there would be no need to pay interest on excess reserves.  That capital would be privately lent, to businesses large and small, old and new.

The Fed now has de-facto set a larger reserve requirement for banks, by paying interest on excess reserves. This is very dangerous.  That excess cash that should be in the market, growing our economy. (As I heard in business school again and again “putting capital to work”).

While overnight LIBOR has trended up since the Fed’s latest announcement (from 0.33% to 0.70% and most likely will continue up to 1.00%), the larger problem is this: For growth opportunities of the US Economy, the same target rate on a larger reserve pool of capital is equivalent to a higher rate on the official “reserve requirements”.

Therefore, when the Fed does cut rates to 50 basis points, what effect will it have?

On November 3rd, I wrote that the market was already stating deflation in the US was on its way. TIP yields were priced way above treasury yields, even correcting for recent large capital flight into the US.

Today, the market reacted to the  price declines in the UK and the US for the month of October:

• For the US, prices declined by 1% for the month of October
• For the UK, October hosted the steepest drop in prices since 1997

Lesson one: even in illiquid times, its hard to bet against the market.

Here are a few reasons why it is not surprising to see price declines of this magnitude in either country.

• I would argue most importantly, both countries have witnessed massive home value declines. Essentially, every family in each country was forced to estimate their now reduced net worth (with great uncertainty) and reign in spending on everything from cars to consumer durables.

• Oil, which both countries import, has declined almost $100 a barrel in the last few months. The fact that oil has declined has two profound effects:

1. While the FED dismissed energy as part of core inflation, increases in energy increase the cost of goods produced and sold (including food), increasing prices throughout the economy. In turn, a decline in energy should result in a decline in all prices.
2. Increases in import prices put stress on the balance of accounts, forcing currency devaluation, which in turn increase prices in the short term. Therefore, a decline in imports (as oil has declined) should improve the current account balance, improve currency (as the dollar has strengthened) and reduce prices.

However, now the UK and the US are in two different positions.

• The UK has a base rate of 3%

• The US has a base rate of 1%

The UK therefore has greater room to maneuver. The US has all but exhausted its monetary toolkit to fight deflation and grow our economy. All but certain, the Fed will slash rates by 50 basis points this December, and perhaps provide guidance it will not increase rates anytime soon.  When Obama assumes office, the new administration can only (and must) invoke a massive fiscal stimulus to revive the economy, hopefully in the form of infrastructure spending and tax cuts.  Across the pond, The UK still has the ability to do both to fight deflation and revive its economy. Further, a decline in rates for the UK should further reduce the Pound, allowing the UK to help export its way out of this malaise. The US does not have this luxury.

While many in the US are against government spending, I hope they realize that as of now, we do not have a choice.

Is the liquidity crunch over?

Here is my thinking:

Let’s review treasury rates (aka, the “riskless” rates) for the US and UK over the next six months. According to the Financial Times data on November 14^th, 2008:

• US treasuries set to expire in six months yield 87 basis points (Deflation).
• UK treasuries set to expire in six months yield 199 basis points (who knows)
• One British Pound today is worth 1.4827 US Dollars
• One British Pound’s worth in six months as of today’s spot forward is 1.4807 US Dollars

The rates for sovereign taxpayer debt and the interlinking value in currency should display the differences in risk of each country.

• $100 invested in US treasuries vs. $100 invested in UK treasuries and converted at the corresponding spot and forward rates should yield the same rate of return.
• Converting $100 to pound equivalents, investing in UK treasuries, and returning those pounds to US Dollars six months from now returns a dollar more (.98 US cents) in value.

In normal times, no way. Someone in any trading house would be looking for the “blips” to quote Michael Lewis from Liar’s Poker. Here are a two observations why this opportunity exists today:

• As discussed in previous posts, we’ve witnessed massive flight to quality recently, as capital has left emerging markets and safe harbored itself in US Treasuries
• The REPO market continues to be stressful. Again, as discussed in previous posts, the lack of shorting treasury opportunities has caused massive spreads differences in otherwise equally risky cash flows.

What is interesting though is that the link between currency and risk still exists for the most part. For the UK though, that means its current treasury yields are tied far more to the US and the Dollar than they are to their own interest rate policy (currently at 3.00%). While the Bank of England has been aggressive in rate reductions, its own government bonds in no way reflect this.

Iceland’s current saga is not a pleasant one. Currently, all banks are nationalized and the government is receiving aid from the IMF. Further, the Bank of Iceland has been forced to raise key interest rates, forcing a recession.

Let’s go back to 2006. According to the IMF, Iceland’s current account deficit grew from 2.6% in 2005 to 4.23% of GDP. The inflation rate was 7% in 2006.

To be sure, credit was certainly cheap in 2006. So cheap that in late November, 2006 the Republic of Iceland issued a five year Euro denominated bond for one billion euros, with a coupon of 3.75% annualy. The yield when it was sold was 3.86% (3.86%!). In context, the bailout of Iceland from the IMF is worth 1.65 billion euros. For a country that two years later would be in default conditions, 2006 certainly was a cheap year.

Remember the good old days of 2006-07?

On a random January 17th, 2007 3-Month LIBOR was 5.36%. Yet two treasuries were bidding 4.91%. The Fed Funds target rate was 5.25%. In short, spreads were short.

More amazing were Emerging Market Bonds and the market’s confidence in sovereign performance.

• On that same January 17th, 2007, the Ukraine’s debt expiring in June, 2013 was priced only 1.35% higher than US government bonds of the same duration.
• South Africa was only 0.97 basis points more and
• Russia, the country that would 18 months later invade Georgia, had debt set to expire in March, 2030 only 100 basis points more than the US treasuries.

(sigh)

The picture is significantly different today.

• At market close on November 12th, Ukraine’s debt noted above is now 18.13% more than US treasuries.
• South Africa’s is 6.61% greater .
• And Russia’s debt is 5.45% higher.

Why?

Current Account Deficits are the place to look.

• Ukraine: At the end of 2006, 3.71% of GDP. Today,  the IMF estimates it is 7.2% of GDP
• South Africa: At the end of 2006, 7.26% of GDP. Today,  the IMF estimates it is 8.0% of GDP
• Russia: At the end of 2006, it had a surplus of 9.50% of GDP. Today,  the IMF estimates it had dropped to 6.4% of GDP.

In general, owing more to debtors outside your own walls creates one of two possibilities:

1. Default (as in the case of Argentina)
2. Currency devaluation, which when importing basic staples or other durables, causes inflation, making the bond payments less valuable

But further, this massive spread increase could also be caused by a flight to “quality” of US Treasuries. Capital is simply skittish of anything but the US Taxpayer. Which, at this point, should give us all pause.

Regardless, the bailout the G1, G3, G7 are trying is crimping the ability for emerging markets to raise capital, increasing strain on IMF funding and solvency.  Crowding out 101 is in effect.

In yesterday’s Financial Times, an article appeared on Ireland’s increasing yield to would be investors of its sovereign debt. While France and Germany’s two year bonds trade at 2.83% and 2.52% respectively, Spain and Italy’s two year bonds trade 3.13% and 3.38% respectively, Ireland had to offer 25 basis points more than average European Yields.

In today’s Financial Times, further evidence of sovereign debt problems as emerging markets are having a harder time raising funds. Most countries signaled out are running high current account deficits. Translation, the sovereign currencies are poised for a revaluation, aka decline.

With current account deficits, there are no foreign reserves (dollars or Euros) to give investors comfort the debt is guaranteed. Many remember the Asian Financial Crisis, where countries debt was loaned in dollars, ran current account deficits, and were forced into dramatic currency revaluations.

Let’s hope the Federal Reserve’s Swaps work.

But the real question is: Given even Euro denominated Ireland’s problems, what would Dani Rodrik do?

Reporter Saskia Scholtes of the Financial Times was wise to diagnose our current crisis correctly almost one year ago on Newshour with Jim Lehrer. We had a “financial markets problem” We still do.

Since Ms. Scholtes’ diagnosis, it is becoming clearer the “financial markets problem” is spreading to the overall economy. This is particularly worrisome over this past week with special attention the Fed’s policy decision.

As we correctly noted in our previous post (to be sure, this blog is large enough for our over sized ego),

Ben Bernanke and the Federal Reserve enacted a massive rate cut. But has it worked? Has it bolstered confidence in the overall markets? We present two frameworks to analyze the cut and the market’s reaction (assuming additional pricing was occurred).

First is oil. Oil’s trajectory in various days in October (below) has been remarkably unchanged.

Sure, oil rose from the cut. But the real story is how powerful dollar’s pricing is behind oil’s future prices. And here is the real concern:

The Fed’s cut has two objectives:

• Lower credit conditions to ease lending strain, bolstering the economy
• In anticipation of further economic contraction, ensure deflationary conditions do not persist.

The Fisher Equation derives the market’s inflation expectations. Below is the previous Monday and Friday (before and after the Rate Cut) TIPS and Treasury Yields, and the derived inflation expectations.

No doubt treasury yields are low in an investor. But suppose treasuries were priced 100 -200 basis points higher. Given TIPS yields, there is still a view we are headed into a deflationary period. Given the dollar’s increased pricing power tomorrow vs. today, it should give us pause about the following:

• What is Oil’s true future price?
• Given that holding cash under the mattress is now worth more tomorrow than it is today, is the treasury fix fixing anything?