Posts from — September 2008

What are the current issues with the bailout plan?

1. Banks will not dilute their equity to the government.
2. The US Congress wants bank equity and further, does not trust Hank Paulson to buy the best CDSs, CMOs, CLOs, and other toxic assets to make the bailout profitable for the taxpayer.
3. We are running out of time. If we do not get a deal done soon, imagine, just imagine what the butterfly spreads on LIBOR at the end of 2009 will look like as banks try desperately to shore up their capital at the close of earnings season.

So let’s act quickly and rationally, using a mechanism we currently operate every day.

Every time the Treasury sells debt to finance the US Government, it runs what is known as a Dutch Auction.

1. It announces how many billions of bonds it intends to sell
2. Everyone intending to buy the bonds bids
   a) An amount
   b) A yield on that amount
3. The Treasury fills its order selecting the best yields and amounts. (for full disclosure, once the Treasury has reached its amount, the highest yield becomes the single yield for all auctioned securities.)

This mechanism is a perfect solution for our current bailout. In short, here is how it would work.

1. The government auctions off a $500 Billion of Equity ($700 may be too much).
2. Registered banks and insurance companies submit anonymous bids of
   a) An amount of capital
   b) A percentage stake of equity stake in each company
3. The Treasury would fill its auction by selecting the best bargains for its dollars.

Once the auctions are awarded, the selected companies would be allowed to do the following:

1. Choose if the awarded money will be preferred equity or common equity
2. If it is preferred, the rate should be floating against current 10 year treasury rate. This should reflect the new marginal cost the taxpayer now incurs to finance the government.
3. If corporations choose to redeem the preferred shares they can buy back the shares at cost plus the current 10 year treasury yield times the share value. The funding would be used to immediately retire treasury debt.
4. If the shares are common, the government can choose to sell these equities at any time or participate in any buy-back plan.

The benefits are as follows:

1. The Taxpayer now owns a share of all banking and economic activity and better, is protected against government borrowing costs.
2. Banks, now with more capital, can write down their subprime assets.
3. In addition, with the participating option, banks need their subprime assets to perform only as well as the treasury rate times the equity they receive. Once they receive their required capital, they can write down their assets to perform as well as a marginal treasury rate.
4. Finally, no one needs to buy anything but equity in banks and insurance companies. If physicists, mathematicians can’t value these assets, let’s not even try. We could administer this auction by election day, move on, and stave off a recession.

Let’s end with a story.

Once, as a broke college student, I attended a church supper with a good friend. After supper was cleared, the entertainment turned to a lottery game, which worked the following way:

1. Everyone who wanted to participate bought a raffle ticket
2. Every round would consist of the Minister drawing a ticket from the bowl
3. If your raffle ticket was selected, you were eliminated from the game
4. Before the beginning of the new round, the remaining entrants could choose to end the game, but only unanimously, and then split the money.

Now, in the early rounds when there were roughly 100 people playing, no way would there be consensus to end the game. But sure enough, as the numbers dwindled down to six or seven, a decision to collude was reached. As a champion of that decision, I too walked away with $300, enough to pay my bills for that month of school.

One by one as the Government works toward a solution, banks are failing and being sold off at miniscule values to the equity holders, eliminated from the game. First it was IndyMac, then Bear Stearns, then Lehman, then AIG, then WaMu and finally yesterday, Wachovia (who by the way, only a week ago had its chairman on CNBC saying how great Wachovia was going to be when it emerged from this crisis).

Maybe they’ll now be few enough to collude in this fashion and take the money as equity, letting us all move on.

Since the First Note, The Government’s Credit Committee, with members Barney Frank, Chris Dodd, and Richard Shelby took more time to get comfortable with Hank Paulson’s proposal.

While the debate in Washington raged on, one month LIBOR increased from 3.19% to 3.70%. Three month LIBOR increased from 3.21% to 3.76%. Commercial Paper increased from 2.50% to 2.70%. Letter of Credit facilities are not expanding. Essentially the way balance sheets are funded is grinding to a halt.

So, how could most corporations raise capital faced with this problem? One answer would be to short treasury securities of the same duration. Simply borrowing the securities, selling them into the market for cash, with the promise to deliver those securities later would do the job.

And why not? Treasury securities expiring on Dec 31 are yielding a paltry 1.02%. Treasury securities expiring on Dec 15 are yielding .68%. Would a betting man believe yields would increase or decrease in the next week? Considering inflation increased over the past year and that the US will sell an additional $700 Billion of debt into the market, yields will most certainly rise.

So, given the demand to short and the rational argument that yields will increase, the fact that the spread is so significant is in fact very significant. Money that normally would buy commercial paper and be infused into interbank offerings is now moving to “quality”. That quality is the United States government backed bonds and notes.

We can quickly examine the balance sheet and income statement of the US Government to know the following:

1. Liabilities just increased by close to $1 trillion, including Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG and the proposed bailout.
2. Projected top line tax revenue is expected to decline as housing values sink and oil relief is still far off.
3. Inflation is still a huge risk.

So how is this quality? The simple answer is that it is not. And if the US Government is not quality, then imagine how much mistrust is in the private market right now. And this is exactly why those shorting trades are not occurring and not helping to re-balance the spread, lowering TED.

For all of 2008 until now, we heard and read the financial sector was amuck, but corporate American remained strong. Yet now, we are conceivably in a macro-economic death-spiral.

1. If companies continue to be faced with high interest rates and refusal of credit, they will stop expanding.
2. Further, for all those companies who did not hedge exposure (and with lack of quality counter-parties, it is conceivable this is a lot), they will be forced to pay higher rates of interest now on all existing loans and notes.
3. To meet higher rates, companies will have to cut expenses, essentially wages. Reductions of wages will depress the economy further.
4. Consumer spending will continue to decline, making more companies unable to meet existing obligations.
5. Credit spreads will increase for fear of company credit and the cycle will continue.

This week will be as wild as the last one….

Secretary of the Treasury Henry Paulson aka Hank, AKA King Henry, the former chairman of Goldman Sachs appeared on Meet the Press this Sunday. He said “Last week there were times when the capital markets or credit markets were frozen.”

Was he lying?

No. Hank was telling the truth.

Let’s look at markets for short term money. Why? When prices for short term money move, prices for other money must concurrently move. Starting on Monday, September 15^th, when Lehman Brothers, an investment bank, declared bankruptcy, one month LIBOR rates for money were 2.49%. Essentially, the base opportunity cost of private investing for one month was 2.49% on an annualized basis. While the S&P 500 and Dow Jones Industrial Index swooned wildly, one month LIBOR ticked up every day, closing on Friday at 3.19%. In other words, the private sector opportunity cost of efficient investment swooned by 33% in five business days.

Why? Did inflation increase? Did oil prices increase? No. None of this occurred. What did occur was the increased need for cash on banks’ balance sheets. Faced with dramatic uncertainty answering questions such as :

• what do we own? and
• what do our competitors own?

The best answer every bank came to was “don’t loan and keep cash for our own security”.

But it wasn’t just LIBOR that increased ….

Short term 30-Day Commercial Paper, the basic note that keeps corporation engines oiled increased from 2.2 to 2.5%. And to show how much the average American did not trust the solvency of the banks (rightly so if all their business model is now preserving cash and not efficiently loaning cash), One Month Certificate of Deposits increased from 2.51% to 5.0% in the same span of days this week. In other words, if you – dear reader - had a goal of opening a CD last Monday, got sick, and went to the bank on Friday, your rate of return would have doubled.

Is this unheard of?

I think so. If we examine the changes in the same rates from randomly June 4 to June 8, 2007 there was no change in LIBOR rates. If we examine the same rates randomly from July 16 to July 20, 2007 again, no change again. LIBOR held steady at 5.32%. What was the Fed Funds discount rate then? 5.25%. Historically, this has been the case: a strong convergence of the two rates.

What was the Fed Funds rate this week? 2.00%.

Let’s take a deep breath: 3.19% one month LIBOR vs. 2.00% Fed Funds Target Rate means private sector’s unease forced efficient private sector rates north of 50% above the “discount rate”. Given this over 100 basis point difference in discount rate money vs. private credit, Hank was most certainly telling the truth.

What could be next?

This week will be as wild as last week.